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Abstract. Industrial applications involving formal methods are still ex-
ceptions to the general rule. Lack of understanding, employees without
proper education, difficulty to integrate existing development cycles, no
explicit requirement from the market, etc. are explanations often heard
for not being more formal. Hence the feedback provided by industry to
academics is not as constructive as it might be.
Summarizing a 25-year return of experience in the effective application
of a formal method – namely B and Event-B – in diverse application
domains (railways, smartcard, automotive), this article makes clear why
and where formal methods have been applied, explains the added value
obtained so far, and tries to anticipate the future of these two formalisms
for safety critical systems.
Keywords: B method, Event-B, integrated development environment,
code generation, formal data validation
1 Introduction
Formal methods and industry are not so often associated in the same sentence as
the formers are not seen as an enabling technology but rather as difficult to apply
and linked with increased costs.In [11], the introduction of the B method and the
Event-B language into several industrial development processes was witnessed
with more or less success, even if new tools and new practices were available to
ease acceptance in industry. At that time, these two formal methods had been
backed by a number of research projects and non-trivial industrial applications.
Almost 10 years later, after several real size experiments in diverse application
domains, the situation has slightly evolved. Some standards, like the D0-178C
for aeronautics, are now accepting formal methods in their certification process
with sometimes some restrictions on the perimeter where they are applied (unit
testing replaced by unit proof for example). The newborn ISO 26262 automo-
tive functional safety standard is also recommending the use of formal methods
during development. On the opposite side, the Common Criteria 3.1 standard
(compared to its version 2.3) has decreased the need for formal methods that are
now only required at level 6+ and higher (instead of 5+ previously) while the
maximum security is reached at level 7 (EAL). However, even if the standards
have made some room for them, these methods haven’t spread much out of the
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railway sphere as it might have been expected. Their usage though have slightly
evolved over the years as a reaction to industry needs in direct relation with
fierce international competition.
This article presents in a first chapter the different ways B and Event-B were
used for modeling software, systems and data, and for proving static and dynamic
properties. In a second chapter, new technology and techniques are presented.
Their tight combination is expecting to converge to a new, more automated way
of developing safety critical applications that are not restricted to the railways.
2 Modeling
2.1 B for Software
The B Method was introduced in the late 80’s to correctly design safe software.
The main idea was to avoid introducing errors by proving the software while
being built, instead of trying to find errors with testing after the software was
produced.
Promoted and supported by RATP, B and Atelier B1 have been successfully
applied to the industry of transportation, through metros automatic pilots in-
stalled worldwide. Paris Meteor line 14 driverless metro is the first reference
application with over 110,000 lines of B models, translated into 86 000 lines of
Ada. No bugs were detected after the proof was completed, neither at the func-
tional validation, at the integration validation, and at the on-site testing, nor
since the beginning of the metro line operation (October 1998).
For years, Alstom Transportation Systems and Siemens Transportation Sys-
tems (representing a major part of the worldwide metro market) have been the
two main actors in the development of B safety-critical software. Both compa-
nies have a product based strategy and reuse as much as possible existing B
models for future metros. As an example, the Alstom Urbalis 400 CBTC (Radio
communication based train control) equips more than 100 metros in the world,
representing 1250 km of lines and 25 % of the CBTC market.
2.1.1 Structure and metrics For such applications, B modeling is used for
safety critical functions for both track-side (zone controller, interlocking) and
on-board (automatic train pilot or ATP) software. The interlocking part has to
avoid having two trains on the same track section. It computes boolean equations
that represent the tracks status as seen from diverse sensors. The automatic pilot
is mainly in charge of triggering the emergency brake in case of over-speed. It
requires several functions such as the localization (where is the train ? ) that
involve several graph-based algorithms, and the energy control which computes
the braking curve of the train, based on the geometry of the tracks (in particular
the positive and negative slopes). Data types used are: integer for the energy
control, booleans for the interlocking and tables of integer for the tracks.
1 the tool implementing the B method
A typical ATP software model is made of one top-level function executed
every cycle.
Fig. 1: Example of a non-deterministic post-condition of a function
The specification of this function (see figure 1) is non-deterministic and is
expressed as a large ”variables become such as” substitution. The specification
of the function, contained in the post-condition, is sufficiently abstract and dif-
ferent from the implementation 2 to avoid to prove the copy-paste from the spec-
ification to the implementation. This implementation imports 55 components.
The complete B project is made of 233 machines (50 kloc3), 46 intermediate
refinements (6 kloc) and 213 implementations (45 kloc), as well the handwritten
code for non-safety critical parts (110 kloc). It also contains 3000 definitions
reused among several components. 23,000 proof obligations are generated, 83%
of these of proved automatically, the remaining 17% requires interactive proof.
3000 mathematical rules were added to ease the proof process, 85% of these are
proved automatically, the remaining 15% requires human manual proof.
To date, the biggest B software is a XML compiler enabling the execution
of safety critical embedded applications by an interpreter. More than 300,000
lines of Ada code are generated from B models, for this SIL4 T3-compliant
(EN50128) program 4. 300,000 lines do not represent the limit of the method
as no bottleneck has been met until now. So the method is likely to scale up to
larger, non-threaded software. A the other end of the scale, with platform screen
doors controllers less demanding in term of computation, smaller applications
are generated for both programmable logic controllers (PLC) and PIC32 micro-
controllers, with a maximum of 64 KB in memory per software.
2.1.2 Organization and acceptance Since 1998, Atelier B has been slightly
improved in order to obtain proven software more quickly:
– proof obligations (PO) contain traceability information (which parts of the
B models have been used to obtain a PO), helping to better locate modeling
errors and to improve modeling style
– a model editor allowing to navigate models (abstraction, refinement) and
operations (caller, callee)
2 which contains the algorithm (statements, operation calls)
3 thousands lines of code
4 T3 means that the tool is able to generate a (faulty) binary program and as such
requires a special attention in the safety process
– a model editor merging model and proof (see figure 2) by displaying the num-
ber of proof obligations associated to any line of a B model, its current proof
status (fully proved or not) and the body of the related proof obligations.
– a framework to automatically prove and review user added mathematical
proof rules, that generates a report for the safety case.
From a human point-of-view, usual organization requires a local guru acting
as a technical referee (usually - but not necessarily - a PhD ) and a team of soft-
ware engineers able to handle abstraction. Introductory B courses (B language,
projects with B) and close support during the first months have been enough
to set up development teams. The forthcoming MOOC on B5 and a dedicated
YouTube channel for Atelier B practitioners would speed up the learning process.
Fig. 2: Text-based model editor combining proof information with modeling
The B software development process is now well-oiled, accepted by certi-
fication bodies and several rail operators worldwide. Without being formally
developed, Atelier B 3.6 was used for METEOR in 1998 while Atelier B 4.2/4.3
is used for Alstom Urbalis 400/500 product line. Atelier B 4.2 is at the core of
the SIL4 certificate obtained for the platform screen-doors controller installed in
2017 in Stockholm (line Citybanan).
2.2 B for Systems
A broader use of B appeared in the mid ‘90s, called Event-B, to analyze, study
and specify not only software, but also systems (system is here considered in
its widest definition). It extends the usage of B to systems that might contain
software, hardware and pieces of equipment, but also to intangible objects like
process, procedure, business rule, etc.. In that respect, one of the outcome of
5 https://moocs.imd.ufrn.br
Event-B is the proved definition of systems architecture and, more generally,
the proved development of, so called, “system studies”, which are performed
before the specification and design of the software. This enlargement allows
one to perform failure studies right from the beginning, even in a large system
development.
2.2.1 Research and development Several European projects were required
to set-up Event-B, among them:
– MATISSE aimed at providing a first definition of the language,
– PUSSEE specifically aimed at hardware/software embedded systems,
– Rodin for the development of the eponymous platform and
– DEPLOY for its deployment in the industry.
Several system studies from diverse application domains (banking, air traffic
control, defense, satellites, etc.) were initially performed with Atelier B before
naturally moving to the Rodin platform. The modeling of the Mazurkiewicz enu-
meration algorithm ands its proof during the project RIMEL 6 was the perfect
demonstration of the suitability of Event-B for small, distributed systems. In
2008, during the certification for a smart-card microcircuit, Event-B was seam-
lessly integrated to Atelier B 7. The supported language slightly differs from the
one supported by Rodin but doesn’t restrict its usability regarding target appli-
cations. Several EAL5+ (CC2.3) and EAL6+ (CC3.1) certifications were per-
formed in France, Germany and Spain, and functional specification were proved
to comply with security policies.
A follow-up project, FORCOMENT [2], was initiated with STMicroelectron-
ics and aimed at providing a proven path from specification to VHDL. Spe-
cific proof obligations were added to ensure a deterministic behavior. Resulting
VHDL was quite different from the one developed manually (similar numbers
of gates, but architecture more easily analyzable) and went successfully through
product test benches. However the technology failed to find its audience because
of:
– (the complexity of) the input formalism,
– the necessity to specify the target system several tens of times (refinements)
with different levels of detail,
– the time and the number of iterations8 to converge to a final model,
– the obligation to allocate our best practitioners to complete the duty.
6 http://rimel.loria.fr/
7 because of the inability, at that time, for the Rodin platform to handle a model with
17 levels of refinement
8 Our maximum is 190 iterations and 5 major refactoring, many modifications having
a slight impact on the structure of the model
2.2.2 Flat specification Event-B was also used as a descriptive language for
behavioral specification (flat specification, no refinement), mainly for document
generation, structural analysis (dependencies among variables) and model ani-
mation with application in the automotive (enhanced diagnosis – Peugeot), in
the defense (military vehicles integration testing scheduling – CNIM) and in the
railways (platform screen doors preliminary studies – RATP).
The main reason for not modeling with refinement was the complexity of
the target systems and the level of detail required to perform an analysis that
would have led to both practical and economical impossibilities (models too large
to be handled by human modelers; too much effort to complete, if reachable).
The Event-B models were sided by a dictionary containing natural language
descriptions of the variables, events and substitutions, allowing for the automatic
generation of document. Events were allocated to ”sub-systems”, allowing to
analyze data-flows (see figure 3) between these sub-systems (where the variables
are read/modified).
A dedicated tool, Composys [10], was developed and maintained to support
this approach until 2012.
Fig. 3: All the dependencies between the sub-systems of a military vehicle an-
alyzed with Composys, and used for defining a non-trivial efficient integration
testing policy. This drawing is for illustrating the complexity of the model.
This approach was more aimed at finding ambiguities in the existing technical
documentation, and at animating the specification than at proving a correct
behavior and was finally abandoned.
2.2.3 Collection of separate models Instead of developing a model of the
whole signaling system , verbose, complex and not containing enough details 9
to ensure a definitive conclusion on the safety of the system, another approach
9 this demonstration requires for example to know the algorithm used for the odome-
ter, to rediscover how the distance between signals and switches is computed based
on the minimum curve radius, tunnel width, maximum slope, minimum train braking
capability, etc.
was tried. The fundamental goal was to extract the rigorous reasoning establish-
ing that the considered system ensures its requested properties, and to assert
that this reasoning is correct and fully expressed. At system level, this rigorous
reasoning involves the properties of different kind of subsystems (from computer
subsystems to operational procedures), that the formal proof shall all encompass.
Event-B is used to formalize the reasoning with a collection of separate models:
each model is readable and understandable by a non-expert and doesn’t require
to dig into hundreds of events and tens of refinement levels. This approach was
used for the system formal verification for the CBTC of New York subway line
7 in 2012 and Flushing in 2014 (effort divided by two due to models reuse).
It is now deployed in Paris for all the new automatic metro lines [15]. Even if
based on refinement, the formal modeling effort is now manageable (each model
is one or two pages long) and only requires engineers able to reason (not our
best practitioners any more). The Event-B language as implemented in Atelier
B in 2008 is still enough to support this modeling approach.
2.3 Formal Data Validation
The verification of a behavior, based on Event-B system specification or B soft-
ware specification, is achievable by semi-automated proof. However the verifica-
tion of static properties of parameters (that tune the system or the software)
against properties may turn out to be a nightmare in case of large data sets
(10,000+ items) and complex relationships among data, as the built-in Atelier
B prover is not able to handle them properly. In the early 2000’s data valida-
tion in the railways [8] used to be entirely human, leading to painful, error-prone,
long-term activities (usually more than six months to manually check constantly
changing 10 100,000 items of data against 1,000 rules).
In 2003, this human process was made more formal while:
– formalizing data properties with the B mathematical language (set theory,
first order logic)
– generating a B machine containing the properties (the data model) and in-
stantiated with the data to verify,
– checking the correctness of the B machine
2.3.1 Rules Properties, issued from international standards, national reg-
ulations, local practices, rail operator requirements, metro manufacturer con-
straints, are modeled as rules (see figure 4). The clause WHERE allows the
selection and filtering of data 11. The clause VERIFY specifies the conditions
expected for all filtered signals. In case the predicates of this clause are not
verified, an error message is displayed for each signal found.
10 CAD data is replaced by real plant data, topology is modified after in situ testing,
etc.
11 that could be stored in files like JSON, Xml, Ecxel, CSV, TXT, etc.
Fig. 4: Example of verification rule. Signals belonging to an interlocking territory
are searched; such signals have to be linked to this interlocking. If not, an error
message is displayed for each faulty signal found.
Most of the rules fit in one page, but some rules are really large, up to
10 pages, as they embed several small steps or they contain a lot of implicit
information. To ensure compliance with safety standard, rules have to be cross-
read and tested by independent engineers. A specific testing environment has
been developed to ease to set up of testing scenarios demonstrating that a rule
triggers a KO conclusion for all error classes.
2.3.2 Deployment The PredicateB predicate evaluator was first used for
checking the correctness. The PredicateB tool is a symbolic calculator able to
manipulate B mathematical language predicates in order to animate a B formal
model: constants and variables initial values are calculated, then operations are
executed depending on enabling conditions and their substitutions. Symbolic
values are scalars, sets, functions, etc. PredicateB has limited capabilities for
non-deterministic computations and was replaced by ProB [9]. The ProB model-
checker embeds several well performing heuristics for reducing search space (sym-
metry detection for example), is able to better handle non-deterministic substi-
tution and to provide a more complete set of counter examples. It has been
modified in order to produce a file containing all counter examples detected and
slightly improved to better support some B keywords.
The major outcome of this decision to introduce formalities and to automate
the verification [13] was a dramatic reduction of the validation duration from
about six months of human verification to some minutes of computation (if we
set aside the time to formalize verification rules). Since then the resulting tools
(certified as T2 and T3 compliant, EN50128 standard) have been experimented
with success 12 on several metro lines worldwide for different metro manufactur-
ers. In this context, more than 2,500 rules have been developed, cross-verified
and applied. The French Railways (SNCF) is going to deploy these tools for
the main lines to check new interlocking parameters for the 10 coming years,
requiring the development of 2,500 more rules.
From a human point-of-view, usual organization requires engineers able to
manipulate mathematical predicates and to understand railways signaling. A
technical referee provides feedback and support on how to model certain tricky
aspects like non-deterministic choices (”find a bijection such as ...”), quantified
predicates, etc. The verification process is well accepted by certification bodies
and by several rail operators worldwide, and is ready to be deployed in other
industries with safety-critical constraints.
2.4 Adoption by Industry
From our experience, industry is not particularly interested in using formal meth-
ods except if it is required by the standards (1) or by the customers (2), or if it
allows to speed up a process by an order of magnitude (3).
Tool B E D Usage Availability
Atelier B X X modeling environment Free
100+ automatic metro lines http://www.atelier.eu/en
ProB X X model-checker Free
https://www3.hhu.de/stups/prob
BMotionWeb X X model animator Free
http://wiki.event-b.org/index.php/BMotion Studio
PredicateB X model animator Free
https://sourceforge.net/p/rodin-b-sharp
PredicateB++ X model animator Proprietary (ClearSy)
Rodin X modeling environment Free
http://www.event-b.org/
DTVT X data validation environment Proprietary (Alstom)
20+ metro and tramway lines
Dave X data validation environment Proprietary (General Electrics)
Singapour metro line
Ovado X data validation environment Proprietary (RATP)
Paris metro lines
Table 1: Summary of the main tools used during the last 25 years for industrial
projects. B/E/D columns refer to B language (B), Event-B language (E) and
formal data validation (D) supports.
12 metro line fully and positively analyzed, results validated by certification body and
independent expert
In our history, (1) is related to smartcard industry (§2.2.1), (2) is associated
with Meteor/RATP (§2.1) and with L7/NYCT (§2.2.3), while (3) is represented
by the formal data validation (§2.3).
In any case, a formal method without a proper tool support is useless. We
have used several tools over the years (Table 1) that were applied in industrial
settings. As such, formal data validation is much appreciated because as a V&V
tool, it doesn’t impact the development cycle (on the contrary of B for software
development) and the verification phase is a ”push-button” activity (once the
formal data model is completed).
3 Convergence
We have seen from the previous chapter that B and Event-B have matured
over the last decade and are addressing well safety-critical industry topics 13, at
system level, at software level, and at configuration level. However using a formal
method is not enough to demonstrate safety. For example, a software can’t be
SIL4-compliant by itself, even if it is developed with B. The hardware executing
it has to be considered, especially its failure modes, and a sound specification at
system level has to be elaborated accordingly. A safety demonstration requires
a lot of experience, skills, time and energy to complete successfully.
We present in this chapter several new features, linked with B, that are
directly contributing to the safety demonstration and that would ease the devel-
opment and the certification processes of safety-critical systems.
3.1 Low Cost High Integrity Platform
LCHIP 14 is a new technology, combining a complete software development envi-
ronment based on the B language and a secured execution hardware platform, to
ease the development of safety critical applications. It relies on several building
blocks already used in certified railways products.
LCHIP relies on a software factory that automatically transforms function
into binary code that runs on redundant hardware. The starting point is a text-
based, B formal model that specifies the function to implement. This model may
contain static and dynamic properties that define the functional boundaries of
the target software.
This formal specification is then refined automatically into a B implementable
model. Transformation rules are applied to the specification to gradually replace
abstract variables and substitutions with concrete ones.
The implementable model is then translated using two different chains:
13 even if re-targeted to address more specific issues
14 A short form of Low Cost High Integrity Platform
– Translation into C ANSI code, with the C4B Atelier B code generator (in-
stance I1). This C code is then compiled into HEX15 binary code with an
off-the-shelf compiler.
– Translation into MIPS Assembly then to HEX binary code, with a specific
compiler developed for this purpose (instance I2). The translation in two
steps allows to better debug the translation process as a MIPS assembly
instruction corresponds to a HEX line.
Fig. 5: The safe generation and execution of a function on the double processor.
3.1.1 Safety These two different instances I1 and I2 of the same function are
then executed in sequence, one after the other, on two PIC32 micro-controllers.
Each micro-controller hosts both I1 and I2, so at any time 4 instances of the
function are being executed on the micro-controllers. The results obtained by I1
and I2 are first compared locally on each micro-controller then they are compared
between micro-controllers by using messages. In case of a divergent behavior (at
least one of the four instances exhibits a different behavior), the faulty micro-
controller reboots. The sequencer and the safety functions are developed once
for all in B by the IDE design team and come along as a library. This way, the
safety functions are out of reach of the developers and can’t be altered. The
safety is based on several features such as the detection of a divergent behavior,
the detection of the inability for a processor to execute an instruction properly16
and the ability to command outputs17. Memory areas (code, data for the two
instances) are also checked (no overlap, no address outside memory range).
15 a file format that conveys binary information in ASCII text form. It is commonly
used for programming micro-controllers
16 all instructions are tested regularly against an oracle
17 outputs are read to check if commands are effective, a system not able to change the
state of its outputs has to shutdown
3.1.2 Target software The execution platform is based on two PIC32 micro-
controllers and provides an available power of 100 MIPS. This processing power
is sufficient to update 50k interlocking Boolean equations per second, compatible
with light-rail signaling requirements. The execution platform can be redesigned
seamlessly for any kind of mono-core processor if a higher level of performance is
required. Similar secured platforms are operating platform-screen doors in Sa˜o
Paulo L15 metro and in Stockholm City line. The Brazilian one has been recently
certified at level SIL3 by CERTIFER on the inopportune opening failure of the
doors.
The IDE provides a restricted modeling framework for software where:
– No operating system is used
– Software behavior is cyclic (no parallelism)
– No interruption modifies the software state variables
– Supported types are Boolean and integer types (and arrays of)
– Only bounded-complexity algorithms are supported (the price to pay to keep
the refinement and proof process automatic)
The whole process, starting from the B model and finishing with the software
running on the hardware platform, is expected to be fully automatic with the
integration of the results obtained from some R&D projects18. In addition several
in-house projects have helped to optimize the automatic refinement process by
improving the refinement engine and by defining a subset of the B language,
Simple B.
3.1.3 Research and development LCHIP [12] is developed by the epony-
mous French R&D project. It is aimed at allowing any engineer to develop a
function by using its usual Domain Specific Language and to obtain this func-
tion running safely on a hardware platform. With the automatic development
process, the B formal method will remain ”behind the curtain” in order to avoid
expert transactions.
As the safety demonstration doesn’t require any specific feature for the input
B model, it could be handwritten or the by-product of a translation process. So
several DSL are planned to be supported at once (relays schematic, grafcet)
based on an Open API (Bxml). The translation from relays schematic is being
studied for the French Railways with a strong focus on the feedback between
DSL and B: in case of unproven B proof obligations, it is mandatory to exhibit
its source in the DSL model.
The project reuses a number of building blocks such as the C4B19 C code
generator extended to support PIC memory model, and the B to Hex binary file
in-house compiler supporting PIC32.
The IDE will be based on Atelier B 5.0, providing a simplified process-
oriented GUI. A first starter kit, containing the IDE and the execution platform,
will be publicly released by the end of 2017.
18 to implement automatic refinement (ANR-RIMEL) and improve automatic proof
performances (ANR-BWARE)
19 Atelier B C code generator
3.2 Proof Support Advances
3.2.1 Proof Support in Atelier B A formal development demands that
different aspects are verified using a mathematical proof. To this end, Atelier B
produces automatically a number of proof obligations (POs). To assist the user
in discharging POs, Atelier B has included a theorem prover since its inception.
This ”historical” theorem prover is an inference engine and an (extensible) rule
database. It has been certified in the railway domain by expert review of both
the inference engine and a core rule base. The architecture of the theorem prover
is such that it can be used interactively, or automatically, at different force levels.
The user applies the theorem prover in batch to all the proof obligations, and
is then left with a number of open POs. The remaining POs can be classified
in three categories: valid, the theorem prover being unable to find the proof;
unprovable, because the rule database is essentially incomplete; unprovable, be-
cause the user made a mistake in the formal development.
The top priority of the user is to ensure that there is no mistake, i.e., there
is no PO of the last category. Visually inspecting the POs is often enough to
detect most such errors, although there are also trickier mistakes that are only
uncovered in the course of an interactive proof.
The user has then to discharge the unproved POs by interactive proof, and
this is the most time-consuming task in a formal development. The prover of
Atelier-B supports a number of commands to develop interactive proofs: hy-
potheses selection, case split, quantifier instantiation, equality rewriting, rule
application, etc. A proof script is successful when the proof obligation has been
shown valid. One a script is successful, it is saved in the project data base, and
can be applied to other proof obligations. Actually, a script is often successful for
more than one PO. To improve scripting capabilities and efficiency, the language
has been enriched with pattern-matching constructs that enable more general
proofs. However, we feel that the interactive proof process should be improved
so that the user would only need to address ”interesting” goals and sub-goals
that require some human insight.
Since the specification language of the B method is undecidable, the user
is allowed to write new rules to be taken into account by the inference engine.
The risk of introducing inconsistencies is mitigated by two measures. The first
measure consists in the inclusion of an alternative prover, based on tableaux, that
is able to prove some of the rules automatically. The second measure applies to
those rules that could not be proved automatically. It consists in the user writing
a textual proof in natural language, that is then subject to validation by a third-
party.
In the past year, Atelier B support for PO verification has been improved
with two different tools, addressing this issue at different levels:
iapa (Interface to Automatic Proof Agents) for batch processing of POs;
drudges of the theorem prover for rapid processing of sub-goals in the interac-
tive prover.
They are presented in turn in the following.
3.2.2 iapa The iapa extension for Atelier B gives access to a number of third-
party provers to discharge POs [5]. In iapa, POs are not translated directly to
the input format of these provers; instead the translation targets the format of
a program verification platform that plays here the role of a gateway to such
automatic provers, namely Why3 [3]. Each PO thus includes a prelude where the
logic of the B expression language is formalized in Why3 [14]. The axiomatization
of the B operators in Why3 has been fine tuned based on an industrial bench-
mark, resulting in significant improvement of the automatic proving capabilities
in Atelier B on that benchmark [6].
Fig. 6: An annotated screenshot of iapa
As the proof obligations are produced automatically, they include all the
hypotheses that are in scope at the point the PO is concerned about. It is often
the case that the validity of the goal only depends on a small number of such
hypotheses. However, at times, provers are not able to identify these relevant
hypotheses and end up lost in the proof search space.
In order to address this issue, iapa includes a hypotheses selection functional-
ity, where the user can identify a subset of the hypotheses, and only this subset
is included in the proof obligation that is translated to Why3 and eventually
processed by the provers. This functionality is available both through a graph-
ical, point-and-click, interface and through a command line language. Subsets
of hypotheses can be created according to the presence of some identifier or set
of identifiers, then added to the proof obligation. Of course iapa also provides a
function to extract a set of free identifiers from the goal or from some subset of
hypotheses. These functionalities are built upon two kinds of entities that the
user can create and manipulate: contexts (subsets of hypotheses) and lexicons
(subsets of identifiers). Full details are available in [5] ; iapa is part of Atelier B
starting from version 4.5.
3.2.3 Drudges of the interactive prover The motivation for this function-
ality was born out of the feeling of frustration that the user of the interactive
prover sometimes feels when she is faced with a seemingly trivial sub-goal, yet
single command is able to discharge it. An example of such situation is when
the current goal can be shown to be a consequence of the hypotheses using the
theory of equality and propositional reasoning, but the terms involved are large
or contain operators that get the automatic prover lost.
Fig. 7: Interface to the drudges in the window of the interactive prover
A general rule is that the less proficient the proof engine, the more efficient
it is. So the rationale of the drudges of the interactive prover is to use automatic
provers for simpler logics that are able to produce not only the result of the
validity check, but also information on how they have reached their conclusion,
and this information is then processed to produce guidance for the automatic
prover of Atelier B.
Fig. 8: State after the successful completion of the drudges : with a single click,
a new rule has been created (right panel) and applied (left panel) automatically,
discharging the goal.
Candidate drudges are provers that are either proof producing, or at least
able to generate a so-called unsat core, i.e. a subset of the hypotheses that are
actually used in the proof. Such functions have been standardized through at
least two initiatives: TPTP [16] and SMT [1]. The drudges currently in the latter
category only (veriT [4] and Z3 [7]), as they implement the unsat core function-
ality. Given the unsat core, a proof rule for the Atelier B prover can be produced
automatically, compiled and applied to the current goal. The drudges are avail-
able as a single click on a new button in the tool bar of the interactive prover
(see figure 7). If the drudges are successful, the current goal is automatically
discharged and the proof rule is added to the rule base of the component (see
figure 8).
4 Conclusion and Perspectives
4.1 Aimed at Industry
Introducing formal methods in industry is difficult. We have experienced this
situation with B in almost all industries, with a wide range of arguments:
– ”we do not want to change of development cycle”
– ”we do not recruit PhD”
– ”formal methods work for train in 1-D, but planes flight in 3-D”
– ”trains and planes have professional drivers, but car drivers are mostly non-
professional”
– ”we are not able to understand your deliverable”
– etc.
The real chance for the B-method was the very difficult development of the
automatic speed control system for rapid transit railways in Paris, SACEM, in
1977, and the decision by the RATP to promote the B-method for the develop-
ment of the first driver-less metro Meteor in 1993.
Several new usages at system-level and at configuration level have emerged
over the last decade, scaling up to industry-strength deployments and offering
new verification means with increased levels of confidence. These techniques
allow to better manage complexity when dealing with large systems. However,
since 1994, B uses have been contained to a narrow scope of industrial software
applications in the railways because of:
– the specific development cycle where unit and integration testing almost
completely disappears,
– the mandatory ability to handle abstraction for efficient modeling,
– a specific code generator per target application to address hardware specifics.
The LCHIP technology, combined with improved proof performances and
provers diversity, pave the way to an easier way of developing SIL4 functions
(including both hardware and software). The platform safety being out of reach
of the software developer, the automation of the redundant binary code genera-
tion process and the certificates already obtained for products embedding LCHIP
building blocks, would enable the repetition of similar performances without re-
quiring highly qualified engineers. The hardware platform is generic enough to
host a large number of complexity-bounded industry applications, with a special
focus on the IoT and nuclear energy20 domains.
4.2 Challenges
Safety-critical systems are certainly privileged targets when considering the ap-
plication formal methods. The risk to injure or kill people may entitle to con-
sider more easily ”exotic” development, verification or validation means. With
the raise of the IoT and the ”connect-anything-to-anything” paradigm, secu-
rity adds a new dimension to analyze and being able to model and prove at
the same time safety and security properties could facilitate the acceptance of
formal methods in the forthcoming standards releases.
Every industry has its own challenges. Based on our experience, our advice
is to know and understand very well a particular application domain, especially
its problems and imagine a usage of your formal method, even for a tiny / very
specific scope21. Aim for the most automated process as industry is very fond of
any ”push-button” tool22 .
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